Of Coal, Climate and Carp: Reconsidering the
Common Law of Interstate Nuisance
Robert V. Percival 1
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances
impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done.
They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of
their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in
this court.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 2
For more than a century states have used the common law of nuisance to seek redress
for transboundary pollution problems. 3 Initially these disputes were heard by the U.S. Supreme
Court exercising its original jurisdiction over disputes between states. Eventually the Court
wearied of using its original jurisdiction and relegated the cases to the lower federal courts. 4
Later the Court embraced the federal Clean Water Act’s comprehensive regulatory programs to
displace federal, 5 but not state, 6 common law. Most recently, when states sought to use public
nuisance law to redress climate change, industry groups urged the Court to bar such actions on
constitutional grounds. Instead in June 2011 the Court held in American Electric Power v.
Connecticut that the Clean Air Act displaced federal nuisance law in the context of climate
change, while reserving the question of its impact on state common law. 7
The Court’s decision in American Electric Power and other interstate nuisance cases
recently decided by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal 8 make this a propitious time to
reconsider the use of public nuisance law to redress transboundary environmental problems.
This paper focuses on what I call the common law of interstate nuisance – a body of law
developed in cases in which states, acting in a parens patriae capacity, have sought to protect
their citizens from environmental harm originating in other states by bringing public nuisance
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actions under either federal or state common law. State attorneys general also have sought to
use public nuisance actions to recover damages from the manufacturers of tobacco products,
firearms, or lead-based paint, 9 but these mass products liability cases are beyond the scope of
this paper. 10
This paper argues that the common law of interstate nuisance remains an essential tool
despite the rise of the modern regulatory state. In the rare cases when existing regulatory
authorities fail to address emerging environmental problems, federal common law can serve as
a backstop. When federal regulatory authorities are capable of addressing transboundary
problems, but fail to do so, common law actions based on the law of source states remain a
viable means of redress for states suffering significant harm from such pollution. Reconnecting
the law of interstate nuisance to its historical roots, the paper concludes that the common law
has been more effective as a “prod” 11 to the development and implementation of new pollution
control technology and to stimulate regulatory action to require its use, rather than as a vehicle
for the judiciary to impose its own comprehensive solutions for transboundary environmental
problems.
Part I reviews the history of the common law of interstate nuisance from the early
twentieth century through the rise of the modern regulatory state. 12 Part II focuses on three
contemporary interstate nuisance disputes – North Carolina’s effort to reduce transboundary
pollution from power plants operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, Connecticut’s efforts
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from utilities operating Midwestern coal-fired power
plants, and efforts by Michigan and other states to stop invasive species of Asian carp from
reaching the Great Lakes. Part III then reevaluates the common law of interstate nuisance in
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light of these precedents, finding that it still can be an effective catalyst for executive or
legislative action to redress transboundary environmental harm.
I. INTERSTATE NUISANCE LAW IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Although Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins held that there “is no federal general common law,” 13
both before and after Erie the Supreme Court recognized that when dealing “with air and water
in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law.” 14 Beginning in 1901 the
Court recognized the right of states to bring common law nuisance actions to redress interstate
pollution.15 These cases were brought directly to the U.S. Supreme Court under its original
jurisdiction conferred by Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution over disputes between states. 16
In a series of decisions between 1901 and 1931 the Court issued injunctions limiting air
pollution from copper smelters, 17 requiring New York City to stop dumping its garbage at
sea, 18 and directing Chicago to construct its first sewage treatment plant. 19 In other cases the
Court denied relief because it found that plaintiff states had failed to prove sufficient causal
injury and/or were themselves engaged in similar polluting activities. 20 At times the Court
expressed discomfort umpiring interstate pollution disputes, 21 but it acknowledged its unique
authority to vindicate the interests of states in protecting their citizens from transboundary
pollution.
Concerned about the fact-intensive character of such litigation, the Supreme Court
eventually relegated interstate nuisance actions to the federal district courts. 22 After efforts to
persuade states to adopt effective regulatory programs failed, in the early 1970s Congress
adopted comprehensive national regulatory legislation to protect air and water quality. The
Court embraced the Clean Water Act as preemptive of the federal common law of interstate
nuisance, while still allowing state common law actions using the law of the source state in
light of the new regulatory programs.
A. Protecting State Sovereignty: Missouri v. Illinois & Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
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In the late nineteenth century, most cities disposed of their sewage simply by dumping
it untreated into nearby lakes or streams. 23 Health problems created by Chicago’s use of this
practice spawned the first major interstate pollution dispute to reach the U.S. Supreme Court.
Chicago disposed of its raw sewage by dumping it into the Chicago River, which
flowed into Lake Michigan, the source of the city’s drinking water. As a result the city suffered
numerous health problems linked to contaminated drinking water including cholera epidemics
and high death rates from typhoid fever. To resolve the city’s sewage disposal problem, the
state of Illinois approved construction of a canal to reverse the flow of the Chicago River to
take the sewage away from Lake Michigan. By 1900 the Sanitary and Shipping Canal was
opened and Chicago’s sewage was flowing down the Chicago River to the Des Plaines River,
which drained into the Mississippi River. Because Missouri cities used the Mississippi as their
source of drinking water, Missouri residents were alarmed.
The Supreme Court allowed Missouri’s attorney general file a common law nuisance
action against Illinois to enjoin Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago from discharging
sewage through the canal. Justice Shiras and five other justices 24 emphasized that “if the health
and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper party to
represent and defend them,” 25 and “that an adequate remedy can only be found in this court at
the suit of the State of Missouri.” 26 Justice Shiras dismissed Illinois’s claim that individual
private nuisance actions could be an adequate remedy for the harm Missouri alleged. 27
After five years of fact-gathering before a special commissioner, a unanimous Court
denied the relief sought by Missouri in February 1906. Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes stated, “Before this court ought to intervene the case should be of serious
magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the principle to be applied should be one which the
court is prepared deliberately to maintain against all considerations on the other side.” 28
Holmes recognized that advances in scientific knowledge, such as acceptance of the germ
theory of diseases, meant that nuisances could include even things that cannot “be detected by
the unassisted senses”. 29 The Court held that Missouri had failed to prove sufficient causal
injury because the experts for both sides were sharply split on whether Chicago sewage was
capable of causing typhoid fever in St. Louis and that there had been no increase in typhoid
cases in cities between St. Louis and Chicago, and it noted that Missouri cities dispose of their
raw sewage in the same river. 30
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A year after it decided Missouri v. Illinois, the Supreme Court decided another
prominent interstate pollution dispute. This time the controversy involved Georgia’s claim that
sulphur dioxide emissions from two copper smelters located just across the border in Tennessee
had destroyed crops and other vegetation in northern Georgia. 31 In October 1905 Georgia filed
suit against the smelters in the U.S. Supreme Court. Citing their economic importance to the
region and their construction of taller smokestacks and more modern furnaces, the smelters
successfully convinced the Court not to grant preliminary relief to the state of Georgia. 32 But
the Court ordered that the case be tried on an expedited basis, so more than 2,000 affidavits
were submitted for the record. 33 While the smelter companies argued that no pollution control
technology had been successfully demonstrated for copper smelters, 34 Georgia insisted that
technology could be developed to capture sulphur to make sulphuric acid. 35 After hearing two
days of oral argument in February 1907, the Supreme Court released its decision on May 13,
1907.
In an opinion by Justice Holmes the Court declared that Georgia had established its
right to obtain an injunction requiring abatement of emissions from the smelters. 36 Holmes
emphasized that this was not a lawsuit between private parties, but instead “a suit by a State for
an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.” 37 Thus, he found it unnecessary for Georgia
to establish that state-owned property had suffered significant harm 38 because “the State has an
interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.” 39
Damages were not adequate to compensate Georgia, Holmes declared, because a state’s
quasi-sovereign rights cannot be bought. 40 Because a state’s sovereign right to protect its
citizens against transboundary pollution was at stake, Holmes declared that the Court should be
less inclined to give weight to the traditional factors relevant to the exercise of equitable
discretion. 41 Holmes declared that: “It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a
31
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sovereign that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous
acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic
destruction they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of
persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered
from the same source.” 42
Reviewing the evidence, Holmes found it clear that the vast quantities of pollution from
the smelters “cause and threaten damage on so considerable a scale to the forests and vegetable
life, if not to health, within the plaintiff State as to make out a case within the requirements of
Missouri v. Illinois.” 43 Having upheld Georgia’s right to an injunction, Justice Holmes left it up
to the state to decide if that was truly its preferred remedy. 44 He concluded his opinion by
stating: “If the State of Georgia adheres to its determination, there is no alternative to issuing an
injunction.” 45 Rather than immediately issuing an injunction, the Court decided to allow “a
reasonable time to the defendants to complete the structures that they now are building, and the
efforts that they are making, to stop the fumes.” 46
While more than a reasonable time passed, a settlement was finally reached in February
1911 between the Tennessee Copper Company and the state of Georgia. 47 However, the
operator of the second smelter, the Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Corporation, refused to
settle. Eventually after more hearings in the Supreme Court, , the Court in May 1914 held that
the Ducktown Company had not met its burden of proving that its emissions no longer were
causing harm in Georgia. 48 On June 1, 1915, the Court issued a decree directing the Ducktown
Company to limit sulphur emissions to 20 tons per day from April 1-October 1 and 40 tons per
day during the rest of year. 49
B. Sewage, Garbage & Water Diversion Conflicts Decided in the 1920s and 1930s
In 1908 sewage disposal problems precipitated another interstate nuisance dispute filed
in the U.S. Supreme Court. The state of New York sued New Jersey in an effort to block
construction of a tunnel that would channel New Jersey sewage discharges away from the
heavily polluted Passaic River and into Upper New York Bay. 50 New York claimed that the
additional discharge of 120 million gallons of sewage per day would cause a public nuisance,
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harm users of the Bay and poison oysters and fish. 51 The federal government intervened and
came to a settlement with New Jersey. 52 However despite the settlement, New York pressed on
with its lawsuit. While testimony was originally taken over a two-year period beginning in
1911, the case was then put on hold due to U.S. involvement in World War I and so more
testimony had to be taken before the case was finally decided in May 1921. 53
Justice John H. Clarke authored a unanimous decision holding that New York had not
presented sufficient evidence to warrant issuance of an injunction. 54 The Court acknowledged
New York’s right to sue New Jersey, but it held that New York had not satisfied its burden of
establishing a serious invasion of its rights “by clear and convincing evidence.” 55 It
emphasized that 900 million gallons of untreated sewage already was being discharged into the
Bay each day by New York from 450 sewers and that the annual growth of New York’s
population added more new sewage each year than the entire capacity of the New Jersey
tunnel. 56 The Court also noted that the federal government had the right to stop New Jersey’s
sewage discharges if they subsequently caused harm, as a result of the settlement agreement,
which Hughes described as the reason for his defeat. 57 In an unusual aside, Justice Clarke
opined that such settlements were likely to effect better solutions to such disputes than any
lawsuits. 58
In 1929 New Jersey turned the tables on New York by suing New York City for
dumping its garbage in the ocean where it eventually would wash up on New Jersey beaches.
This time the Court appointed a special master to hear testimony in the case. 59 The special
master found that New York City had caused enough garbage to wash upon New Jersey shores
to fill 50 trucks, damaging fish nets and making swimming impracticable. 60
The Court rejected New York City’s claim that because the ocean dumping occurred
beyond what then was the 3-mile limit of the nation’s territorial waters it was beyond the
Court’s jurisdiction. 61 The Court noted that the “situs of the acts creating the nuisance, whether
within or without the United States, is of no importance” because the harm occurred in the
United States and the defendant was properly before the Court and subject to its jurisdiction. 62
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In December 1931 the Court issued an injunction barring New York City from dumping
garbage into the ocean effective June 1, 1933, the date recommended by the special master in
order to enable the city to build new incinerators. 63 The Court also ordered the city to use its
existing incinerators at full capacity to reduce the amount of garbage dumped into the ocean
and to report to the Court every six months concerning its progress in building new
incinerators. 64 After it became clear that New York City would not meet the deadline for
ending ocean dumping, contempt proceedings were held. In December 1933 the Court
extended the deadline to July 1, 1934, while imposing a $5,000 per day fine on the City if it
missed this new deadline. 65 The construction of two new incinerators ultimately enabled the
City to meet the new deadline.
Chicago’s sewage disposal problems, discussed above, ultimately became a water
diversion problem because Chicago had to divert growing volumes of water from Lake
Michigan to flush growing volumes of sewage through the Sanitary and Shipping Canal. After
the District ignored its permit limits by tripling the flow, the federal government then sued in
federal district court to enforce the permit limits. It took nearly seven years before a decision
was issued, perhaps due to World War I, but the district court ultimately ruled in favor of the
federal government. In January 1925 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment against the
Sanitary District. 66 Recognizing that the city could not immediately reduce the size of its
diversion without causing major public health problems, the Court permitted the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to increase temporarily the size of the permitted diversion from 4,167 to
8,500 cubic feet/second, the amount the District had been diverting. This decision was
conditioned on Chicago’s agreement to build sewage treatment capacity for at least one third of
its citizens by the end of 1929. 67
Meanwhile Illinois and the Sanitary District also were facing a lawsuit filed by the
upper Great Lakes states in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1924. Wisconsin, Michigan, and New
York had sued Illinois and the Sanitary District for allegedly diverting so much water from
Lake Michigan that it had reduced the level of the Great Lakes by five to six inches, causing
serious injury to people and property. 68 Missouri and four other downstream states intervened
to join Illinois as a defendant because of their interest in keeping as much water as possible
flowing through the drainage canal to the Mississippi River.
The Court accepted jurisdiction and appointed former Justice Charles Evans Hughes to
serve as a special master. After taking extensive testimony, Hughes reported in November
1927 that the allegations by the upper Great Lake states were correct. 69 In January 1929 the
Court accepted Hughes’s recommendations and ruled in favor of the upstream states. In an
opinion by Chief Justice William Howard Taft the Court rejected the notion that the federal
permit relieved Illinois and the Sanitary District from liability for harm caused to upstream
63
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states. The Court concluded that the upstream states were entitled to equitable relief, 70 and it
ultimately issued an injunction requiring Chicago to build sewage treatment plants to reduce its
need to divert water from Lake Michigan. 71
C. In the 1970s the Supreme Court Sours on Exercising its Original Jurisdiction
The U.S. Supreme Court’s long-time frustration with using its original jurisdiction to
hear fact-intensive interstate nuisance suits and its difficulty fashioning effective remedies for
them ultimately led it to relegate such cases to the lower federal courts. On three occasions in
1971 and 1972, the Court declined requests to hear interstate nuisance cases in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction. In a fourth case in which it had appointed a special master, the Court
refused to accept continuing responsibility for monitoring the implementation of a settlement
agreement.
In 1970 the state of Ohio sought to bring an original action in the Court against the
Wyandotte Chemical Corporation and Dow Chemical of Canada to stop and remediate mercury
pollution of Lake Erie. After scheduling an unusual oral argument on the question of whether
to accept jurisdiction, the Court declined to hear the case. 72 In an opinion by Justice Harlan the
Court explained that even though it could exercise its original jurisdiction to hear the case “no
necessity impels” the Court to be the “principal forum for resolving such controversies.” 73
Harlan lamented the Court’s difficulty in resolving disputes of interstate air and water
pollution. Noting the decisions in Missouri v. Illinois and New York v. New Jersey, Harlan felt
the Court’s attempts to resolve the conflicts were futile because of the complex technical and
political matters that were inherent in these cases and were becoming worse because of the
novel scientific questions that have no clear answer. 74 Acknowledging the intense public
concern for the environment that then prevailed, Justice Harlan conceded that stopping
pollution “is manifestly a matter of fundamental import and utmost urgency.” 75 But he
described the Court’s refusal to hear the case as reflecting “that our competence is necessarily
limited, not that our concern should be kept within narrow bounds.” 76
Only Justice William O. Douglas dissented. He too acknowledged the complexity of the
issues presented by the case, but he argued that they were no more difficult than the complex
issues that arise in water rights disputes between states that the Court routinely hears. 77
70

Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930) and 281 U.S. 696 (1930).
72
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 494 (1971).
73
Id. at 495-496.
74
Id. at 501-03. The papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall reveal that on the morning of oral
argument, Chief Justice Burger distributed an unusual memo strongly cautioning his colleagues about
the implications of a decision to hear the case. The Chief Justice cited the vast range of pollution
problems facing the 50 states and the complexity of the issues. “If we do grant leave to file, I believe we
should consider appointing not one but three Special Masters, at least one of whom should be a scientist
with background in the subject matter and without conflicting attachments or published positions on the
subject matter.” Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference, Jan. 18, 1971.
75 Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. at 505.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 511 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71

9

Douglas cited the long-running dispute between Wisconsin and Illinois over the diversion of
waters from Lake Michigan as well as disputes between Arizona and California over the
Colorado River and disputes between Colorado, Wyoming and Nebraska over the waters of the
North Platte River. 78
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I) Illinois sought permission from the Court
to bring an original action against four Wisconsin cities for polluting Lake Michigan by
discharging 200 million gallons of raw or poorly treated sewage each day. 79 While the
existing Federal Water Pollution Control Act had created a cumbersome, and ultimately futile,
interstate conference procedure to encourage states to settle interstate water pollution disputes,
the Court rejected the notion that this preempted Illinois’s action. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice William O. Douglas noted that it “may happen that new federal laws and new
federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until
that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits
alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution.” 80 The Court recognized that “this
original suit normally might be the appropriate vehicle for resolving this controversy,” but it
chose instead to exercise its “discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate district court
whose powers are adequate to resolve the issues.” 81
The Court held that states could bring federal common law nuisance actions in the
district courts because they arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1331. 82
The Court cited with approval the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Texas v. Pankey 83 as proof that
federal district courts could hear interstate nuisance actions. 84 Quoting from Pankey in a
footnote the Court stated that “[u]ntil the field has been made the subject of comprehensive
legislation or authorized administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide
an adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights.” 85 But it also
explained that “consideration of state standards may be relevant” because “a State with high
water-quality standards may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not be
compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neighbor.” 86 The Court
explained that when lower federal courts hear interstate nuisance actions “[t]here are no fixed
rules that govern; these will be equity suits in which the informed judgment of the chancellor
will largely govern.” 87
In April 1972 the Court did agree to hear an interstate pollution dispute in exercise of its
original jurisdiction because it involved a lawsuit between two states. In Vermont v. New York
the Court appointed a special master, who was able to negotiate a settlement between the
78
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parties involving a paper mill in New York. However, the Court stunned the parties in June
1974 by refusing to approve a proposed consent decree. 88 The Court explained that it did not
want to assume continuing responsibility for supervising implementation of a consent decree in
the absence of any law to apply. 89 This “would materially change the function of the Court in
these interstate contests” to one of performing arbitral rather than judicial functions. 90
D. Displacement of Federal Common Law, but Not Source State Common Law
After failing to convince the U.S. Supreme Court to hear its nuisance action against the
City of Milwaukee as an original action, Illinois refiled its lawsuit in federal district court in
Illinois. Less than five months later Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act) over President Nixon’s veto, 91 setting up a showdown
over whether common law had been preempted because Illinois maintained that the permits
issued to Milwaukee’s plants still allowed levels of pollutant discharges that would constitute
public nuisances. 92
After a six-month trial, in July 1977 the Illinois federal district court upheld the state’s
claim that Milwaukee’s discharge constituted a public nuisance under federal common law and
rejected the argument that the new Clean Water Act permit program preempted the federal
common law of nuisance. 93 It ordered the city to meet more stringent effluent limits and to
construct facilities to eliminate combined sewer overflows by 1989. 94
On appeal the Seven Circuit recognized the comprehensiveness of the Act’s new
regulatory program for controlling pollution; however, it still affirmed the district court’s
holding that federal common law was not preempted. 95 The court noted that §510 of the Act 96
preserves the authority of states to adopt more stringent standards than required by the Act, and
it cited §511’s directive that the Act not be construed to limit the federal authority under any
other law, which it construed to include federal common law. The court also noted that the
savings clause in the citizen suit provision of the Act 97 expressly preserved any common law
claims, which it interpreted to include both state and federal common law. 98 While concluding
that the district court had failed to justify imposing more stringent effluent limits for certain
pollutants, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order to eliminate combined sewer
overflows and to impose a new limit on phosphorus discharges. 99
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When Milwaukee sought review of the Seventh Circuit’s decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Court initially voted to deny review. However, after Justice White drafted a dissent
from denial of certiorari questioning the competence of courts to impose effluent limits stricter
than those required in existing permits, 100 the Court agreed to hear the case. At oral argument
the Solicitor General appeared as an amicus supporting Illinois’s position that the Clean Water
Act did not preempt the federal common law of nuisance. In April 1981 the Court held that the
Act had preempted federal common law when it decided City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
(Milwaukee II). 101
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist the Court noted that legislative preemption of
federal common law did not implicate the same federalism concerns that require clear
expressions of congressional intent before state law may be preempted. 102 Justice Rehnquist
interpreted the language of section 505(e) narrowly to mean ‘‘that nothing in §505, the citizensuit provision, should be read as limiting any other remedies which might exist. . . . [I]t means
only that the provision of such suit does not revoke other remedies. It most assuredly cannot be
read to mean that the Act as a whole does not supplant formerly available federal common-law
actions but only that the particular section authorizing citizen suits does not do so.’’ 103 Citing
the comprehensive nature of the Clean Water Act’s regulatory scheme and the technical
complexities courts would have to confront to formulate pollution control standards, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that Congress implicitly had supplanted federal common law by adopting
a comprehensive regulatory scheme for water pollution control. 104 Justice Rehnquist
concluded that “[t]he establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by
Congress, which certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, strongly
suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal
common law.” 105 He went on to note that application of federal common law would be
“peculiarly inappropriate in areas as complex as water pollution control. . . . Not only are the
technical problems difficult—doubtless the reason Congress vested authority to administer the
Act in administrative agencies possessing the necessary expertise—but the general area is
particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under a regime of federal common law.
Congress criticized past approaches to water pollution control as being ‘sporadic’ and ‘ad hoc,’
apt characterizations of any judicial approach applying federal common law.” 106

100

In his draft dissent Justice White noted that he did “not necessarily disagree with the decision
below,” but “that there is substantial doubt as to whether Congress intended that inexpert federal courts,
guided by principles of common law nuisance and maxims of equity jurisprudence, could impose
environmental duties stricter than those adopted through democratic processes and developed by
supposedly expert federal and state agencies.” Justice White expressed the fear that “many interstate
bodies of water . . . could become the subject of federal common law nuisance actions.” Memorandum
from Justice Byron R. White circulating Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari, March 3, 1980.
101
451 U.S. 304 (1981).
102
Id. at 316-17.
103
Id. at 328-329 (emphasis in original).
104
Id. at 317-19.
105
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 318-319 (emphasis in original).
106
Id. at 325 (citations omitted).

12

Justice Rehnquist noted that Illinois was free to pursue its case for more stringent
controls on Milwaukee’s discharges before the Wisconsin state agency responsible for issuing
Milwaukee a permit under the Clean Water Act. 107 But he maintained that “[i]t would be quite
inconsistent with this scheme if federal courts were in effect to ‘write their own ticket’ under
the guise of federal common law after permits have already been issued and permittees have
been planning and operating in reliance on them.” 108
In dissent Justice Blackmun, joined by two other Justices, argued that the savings clause
and legislative history of the Act clearly expressed an intent by Congress not to preempt federal
common law. 109 While conceding that interstate nuisance cases often are complex and require
difficult judgments, Blackmun argued “they do not require courts to perform functions beyond
their traditional capacities or experience.” 110 He concluded that the Court’s decision was
particularly unfortunate because it would undermine efforts to promote “a more uniform federal
approach to the problem of alleviating interstate pollution.” 111
Two months after deciding Milwaukee II the Court extended preemption of federal
common law to cover ocean waters. The Court concluded that the Ocean Dumping Act’s
comprehensive permit scheme regulating discharges to such waters 112 preempted the federal
common law of nuisance because it “is no less comprehensive, with respect to ocean dumping,
than are analogous provisions” in the Clean Water Act. 113 Two decades later, when it rejected
Exxon’s claim that the Clean Water Act preempted private claims for punitive damages for
pollution caused by the Exxon Valdez spill, the Court distinguished Milwaukee II and National
Sea Clammers. 114 The Court described these as cases “where plaintiffs’ common law nuisance
claims amounted to arguments for effluent discharge standards different from those provided
by the CWA.” 115 The ‘‘private claims for economic injury’’ in the Exxon Valdez litigation ‘‘do
not threaten similar interference with federal regulatory goals,’’ the Court explained. 116
Left unresolved by Milwaukee II was the question whether the Clean Water Act
preempts state common law actions. In International Paper Company v. Ouellette, 117 the Court
held that the Clean Water did not preempt state common law so long as the law of the source
state was applied. 118 Ouellette involved a private nuisance action brought by 150 lakeshore
property owners in Vermont state court against the same paper mill that had spawned Vermont
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v. New York. 119 The defendant removed the action to federal court, where it maintained that the
Clean Water Act preempted state common law in light of the Milwaukee II decision.
In Ouelette the Solicitor General again appeared as an amicus to support the plaintiffs’
position that the Clean Water Act did not preempt state common law actions. The Court
agreed, but five Justices insisted that in transboundary nuisance cases only the common law of
the source state could apply. 120 The papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall indicate that
these Justices struggled mightily to come up with a legal justification for this conclusion, which
was largely a product of what they thought would represent good policy. 121
Justice Powell’s majority opinion ultimately rested preemption of the receiving state’s
common law on the fear that downstream states could interfere with the goals of the Act by
dictating unreasonably stringent and potentially conflicting standards on upstream sources. 122
But he concluded that “nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance
claim pursuant to the law of the source state,” citing the express preservation of the right of
states to impose more stringent standards on their own point sources in the Act’s savings
clause. 123 The four dissenters criticized any preemption of state common law and argued that
federal courts should apply normal choice-of-law principles when hearing state common law
actions over interstate pollution.124
II. 21ST CENTURY INTERSTATE NUISANCE LITIGATION
At the dawn of the 21st century, the Supreme Court no longer was in the business of
using its original jurisdiction to hear interstate pollution disputes between states. Such disputes
were relegated to the lower federal courts three decades ago in Milwaukee I. As a result of
Milwaukee II and National Sea Clammers the federal common law of nuisance for water
pollution had been entirely displaced by the Clean Water Act and the Ocean Dumping Act. It
was widely assumed that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which added a
comprehensive federal permit program to the Act, also would preempt federal common law
nuisance actions for interstate air pollution whenever a court was forced squarely to confront
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such a case. 125 Yet due to the Ouellette decision state common law nuisance actions for
transboundary pollution remained alive so long as the law of the source state was applied. 126
Since 2004 three significant public nuisance actions have been filed by states to redress
transboundary environmental problems. One, founded on state common law, sought to require
aging, coal-fired power plants with inadequate pollution controls to reduce their transboundary
emissions. The other two invoked federal common law to address problems that at the time
were not specifically addressed by existing regulatory legislation. These cases, which will be
reviewed below, offer some insights on the present state and future evolution of the common
law of interstate nuisance.
A. Coal: North Carolina v. TVA
In an effort to deal with significant air quality problems in its state the North Carolina
General Assembly in 2002 adopted the Clean Smokestacks Act. The legislation tightened
emissions standards on in-state sources of air pollution and required state authorities to use “all
available resources and means” (including the filing of lawsuits) to achieve comparable
reductions from out-of-state sources. 127 Pursuant to this legislation, North Carolina petitioned
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require upwind states to control their
emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx). 128 The petition was filed to
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reduce interstate transport of fine particulate matter and ozone pursuant to §126 of the Clean
Air Act. 129
Frustrated by its inability to control transboundary pollution entering its state from
aging, coal-fired power plants located in upwind states, North Carolina on January 30, 2006,
filed a public nuisance action in federal district court against the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA). 130 The lawsuit claimed that emissions from eleven TVA power plants in Tennessee,
Alabama, and Kentucky harmed residents of North Carolina by causing premature deaths,
hospitalizations for respiratory and cardiovascular complications, exacerbations of asthma
attacks, and harm to the environment. 131 The state sought an order requiring the TVA to abate
the interstate pollution by installing pollution controls at an estimated cost of $3 billion. 132
While conceding that some emissions from its power plants contribute to pollution in
North Carolina, the TVA maintained that its plants did not cause an unreasonable amount of
transboundary pollution and that any harm to health and the environment was largely due to
North Carolina’s own in-state sources of pollution. 133
As a preliminary matter TVA argued that it could not be sued for various reasons
including sovereign immunity which the district court rejected. On an interlocutory appeal the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 134 The Court held that the provisions of
§118(a) of the Clean Air Act 135 subjecting federal facilities to all state requirements included
state common law nuisance actions, thus waiving any sovereign immunity. 136
The district court also rejected TVA’s claim that compliance with federal statutes and
regulations insulated the power plants from public nuisance liability. 137 Judge Lacy H.
Thornburg stated that Ouellette “speaks conclusively to the current dispute. TVA is open to suit
despite its alleged compliance with its permits, based on the ‘additional authority’ of the source
states' nuisance laws. In return, however, TVA is protected from being sued under the nuisance
laws of those states -- such as North Carolina -- who claim to be affected by its pollution.” 138
The trial judge also noted that the laws of Alabama, Kentucky and Tennessee all provided that
“otherwise lawful actions may be the subject of nuisance lawsuits.” 139
129
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In July 2008 the district court held a 12-day bench trial. District Judge Thornburg noted
that under the Supreme Court’s Oullette decision it must apply the common law of public
nuisance of the source states but also noted that “the public nuisance laws of these states do not
differ significantly from those of their sister states across the country.” 140 The judge ultimately
decided that North Carolina had established that emissions from three TVA plants located
within 100 miles of the North Carolina border (one in Alabama and two in Tennessee)
constituted a public nuisance under the law of the source states. 141 But the judge concluded that
the seven other plants were “too remote to significantly impact air quality in North
Carolina.” 142 On January 13, 2009, Judge Thornburg issued an injunction setting an emissions
cap for each of the three TVA plants located within 100 miles of the North Carolina border. 143
The judge required the plants to install and continuously operate scrubbers and selective
catalytic reduction plants (SCRs) at an estimated cost of more than $1 billion. 144
In July 2010 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed Judge
Thornburg’s decision. In an opinion by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, the court ruled that so long
as the TVA’s power plants were in compliance with existing Clean Air Act regulations they
could not be nuisances at common law. 145 Despite evidence that the pollution was causing harm
in North Carolina, the Fourth Circuit stated that the ruling should be reversed because it “would
encourage courts to use vague public nuisance standards to scuttle the nation’s carefully created
system for accommodating the need for energy production and the need for clean air. The result
would be a balkanization of clean air regulations and a confused patchwork of standards, to the
detriment of industry and the environment alike.” 146
By holding that compliance with federal Clean Air Act regulations automatically
insulates a source from nuisance liability, the Fourth Circuit essentially preempted state
common law in defiance of the Supreme Court’s Ouellette decision. Recognizing this, Judge
Wilkinson stated that the court “need not hold flatly that Congress has entirely preempted the
field of emissions regulation,” that “we cannot state categorically that the Ouellette Court
intended a flat-out preemption of each and every conceivable suit under nuisance law,” and that
he “cannot anticipate every circumstance that may arise in every future nuisance action.” 147 But
even actions taken in “accordance with state and federal regulations” and “permissible under various
permits” may still support a claim for nuisance if the plaintiff “can prove the elements of nuisance”);
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he relied on Ouellette for the proposition that any common law action that interferes with or
undermines the regulatory scheme established by statute should be preempted, concluding that
Ouellette “created the strongest cautionary presumption against” nuisance actions seeking to
establish different emissions standards. 148
Judge Wilkinson also launched an assault on public nuisance as “an ill-defined omnibus
tort of last resort” that “encompasses environmental concerns . . . at such a level of generality
as to provide almost no standard of application.” 149 He questioned “whether expert witnesses in
bench trials can replicate the sources that EPA can bring to bear” and expressed serious doubt
“that Congress thought that a judge holding a twelve-day bench trial could evaluate more than a
mere fraction of the information that regulatory bodies can consider.” 150
In his opinion for the panel Judge Wilkinson later shifts gears and accuses the trial court
of applying North Carolina law rather than the law of the source states as required by
Ouellette. 151 But the court appears confused by the fact that North Carolina essentially codified
the nuisance law of the source states when it adopted new legislation requiring North
Carolina’s own powerplants to adopt emission controls that would be required to prevent
significant harm from transboundary pollution. The court interprets the trial court as applying
the law of the receiving state -- North Carolina -- when in fact there is no indication that the
common law of source states Alabama or Tennessee is any more forgiving of the plants’
pollution.
North Carolina’s litigation ultimately came to a surprising end. On February 2, 2011
North Carolina filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review
the Fourth Circuit’s decision. 152 Although the TVA generally has independent litigating
authority, when Supreme Court review is sought in a case involving a federal agency the Office
of the Solicitor General becomes involved and it may consult with other federal agencies, such
as EPA, about the case. After the Court granted two extensions of time for the filing of TVA’s
response, on April 14, 2011, a stunning settlement was announced. The U.S. Department of
Justice announced that TVA had agreed to close 18 old coal-fired electrical generating units
(EGUs) at three power plants in settlement of litigation by states and environmental groups
charging the TVA with violations of the Clean Air Act's new source review (NSR) provisions.
The EGUs that TVA agreed to close were located at the very plants that had been the
subject of the district court’s injunction in North Carolina’s litigation. 153 They were more than
50 years old and had operated for decades without modern pollution control equipment because
they were grandfathered-in when the 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) was adopted. 154 Although
Congress contemplated that they eventually would be replaced by generating units that with
modern pollution control technology required by the Act for new sources, the TVA had
148
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continued to renovate them to take advantage of the CAA's failure to control existing
sources. 155 Eight of the EGUs that will be shut down had been subject to the district court’s
order to install new pollution control equipment due to North Carolina' lawsuit. 156 The
settlement will reduce TVA's emissions of sulfur dioxide by 97 percent below 1977 levels and
nitrogen oxides by 95 percent. 157 TVA also will spend between $3 and 5 billion to upgrade
pollution controls at plants that it will continue to operate. 158 Due to the settlement, North
Carolina stipulated to dismissal of its cert petition, which was dismissed on July 22, 2011
pursuant to Rule 46 of the Supreme Court. 159
B. Climate: American Electric Power v. Connecticut
In July 2004 eight states 160 and the City of New York filed a federal and state common
law nuisance action against six of the largest electric utilities in the United States. The suit
alleged that power plants operated by the defendant utilities contribute 10 percent of U.S.
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), a greenhouse gas that contributes to global warming and
climate change. 161 The plaintiff states claimed that global warming already had begun to alter
the climate of the United States and that it was causing significant harm to them. 162 They
sought an order holding the defendants jointly and severally liable for contributing to global
warming and an injunction ordering the companies to cap their emissions of CO2 and then to
reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade. 163
The case raised the question whether the Clean Air Act preempts the federal common
law of nuisance for interstate air pollution. While the Act was amended in 1990 to add a
comprehensive permit program like that of the Clean Water Act, at the time the lawsuit was
filed it had not been used to regulate emissions of CO2. During the George W. Bush
administration EPA’s general counsel took the position that the agency has no authority to
regulate CO2 emissions under the Clean Air Act.
On September 15, 2005, federal district judge Loretta Preska dismissed the states’
lawsuit without reaching the preemption issue. 164 Judge Preska held that the case presented
nonjusticiable political questions. 165 She distinguished previous interstate nuisance cases like
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper and New Jersey v. New York City, by noting that none “has
touched on so many areas of national and international policy’’ as the climate change
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litigation. 166 Judge Preska concluded that the “explicit statements of Congress and the
Executive on the issue of global climate change in general and their specific refusal to impose
the limits on carbon dioxide emissions Plaintiffs now seek to impose by judicial fiat confirm
that making the ‘initial policy determination[s]’ addressing global climate change is an
undertaking for the political branches.” 167 Judge Preska stated that: “[b]ecause resolution of the
issues presented here requires identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign
policy, and national security interests,” the case “presents non-justiciable political questions
that are consigned to the political branches, not the Judiciary.” 168
Judge Preska’s decision was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which heard oral argument in June 2006. The court then put the case on hold while
waiting for the U.S. Supreme Court to decide Massachusetts v. EPA, a case that challenged
EPA’s refusal to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the Clean Air Act. In
April 2007 the Court in a 5-4 decision held that climate change sufficiently affected the state of
Massachusetts to give it standing to challenge EPA’s failure to regulate emissions of GHGs. 169
On the merits the Court held that EPA did have the authority to regulate emissions of GHGs
under the Clean Air Act if it found that they “endanger” public health or welfare by
contributing to global warming and climate change. The Court remanded the case to EPA to
consider whether to make an “endangerment finding.”
A key aspect of the Court’s decision narrowly upholding the plaintiffs’ standing was the
majority opinion’s reliance on Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., a case that had not been cited
in any of the many briefs filed with the Court. 170 Citing the Tennessee Copper decision, Justice
Stevens’s majority opinion stated, “Well before the creation of the modern administrative state,
we recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction.” It then noted that “[j]ust as Georgia’s ‘independent interest . . . in all the earth and
air within its domain’ supported jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ wellfounded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today.” 171
After a round of supplemental briefing on the impact of Massachusetts v. EPA, two
years elapsed before the Second Circuit panel released its decision. The decision was released
on September 21, 2009, just six weeks after one of the panel’s members, Judge Sonia
Sotomayor, had been elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court. The remaining two judges on the
panel, Judge Hall, joined by Judge McLaughlin, issued a 90-page opinion that reversed Judge
Preska’s decision and held that climate change was not a nonjusticiable “political question.” 172
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The court held that the states had parens patriae and Article III standing, and that New York
City and the land trusts who had joined the litigation had Article II standing. 173 The court also
found that the Clean Air Act did not displace the plaintiffs’ common law nuisance claim,
allowing the case to go forward to trial. 174 The court noted that Massachusetts v. EPA made it
“clear that EPA has statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases as a ‘pollutant’ under the
Clean Air Act.” 175 But although EPA had issued a proposed endangerment finding in April
2009 the court concluded that “until EPA makes the requisite findings, for the purposes of our
displacement analysis the CAA does not (1) regulate greenhouse gas emissions or (2) regulate
such emissions from stationary sources.” Thus, it concluded that the problem has not been
“thoroughly addressed” by the CAA, unlike the situation in Milwaukee II. 176 The court held
that “neither Congress nor EPA has regulated greenhouse gas emissions from stationary
sources in such a way as to ‘speak directly’ to the ‘particular issue’ raised by Plaintiffs.” 177
Thus, it concluded that Connecticut’s lawsuit had not been displaced by the Clean Air Act.
The Supreme Court then agreed to review the Second Circuit’s decision. Numerous
industry groups implored the Court to hold that climate change litigation raised nonjusticiable
political questions or to reject the lawsuit on the grounds that the effects of climate change were
too diffuse or uncertain to give rise to Article III standing. 178 Some private nuisance actions
had been filed against oil companies seeking damages for their contribution to climate
change 179 and many defendants hoped the Supreme Court would preclude all such litigation on
constitutional grounds. The Solicitor General, representing the Tennessee Valley Authority,
argued that the Court should dismiss the case not for lack of Article III standing, but for lack of
prudential standing because the global nature of climate change makes it a generalized
grievance best addressed by the political branches of government. 180 Due to the recusal of
Justice Sonia Sotomayor only eight Justices heard the case. 181
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By a 4-4 vote the Court first affirmed the Second Circuit’s rejection of arguments that
the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the case raised a non-justiciable political question. 182
The Court stated that four of its members “would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article
III standing under Massachusetts [v. EPA], which permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and, further, that no other threshold obstacle bars review”
including the political question doctrine or the Solicitor General’s argument that the case
should be dismissed because of a prudential bar to adjudicating generalized grievances. 183 Four
other Justices, likely the dissenters in Massachusetts v. EPA, “would hold that none of the
plaintiffs have Article III standing.” 184
In her opinion for the unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg then endorsed the propriety of
federal courts fashioning federal common law in the area of environmental protection. 185
Citing Erie r. Co. v. Tompkins, she explained: “The ‘new’ federal common law addresses
‘subjects within national legislative power where Congress has so directed’ or where the basic
scheme of the Constitution so demands.” 186 Justice Ginsburg declared that “[e]nvironmental
protection is undoubtedly an area ‘within national legislative power,’ one in which federal
courts may fill in “statutory interstices,” and, if necessary, even “fashion federal law.” 187 She
quoted the statement in Milwaukee I that: “When we deal with air and water in their ambient or
interstate aspects, there is a federal common law.” 188
Justice Ginsburg then noted that the Court had never decided whether private citizens,
such as the plaintiff land trusts in the case, or political subdivisions of states such as New York
City could invoke the federal common law of nuisance to seek redress for interstate
pollution.189 “Nor have we ever held that a State may sue to abate any and all manner of
pollution originating outside its borders.” 190 Justice Ginsburg noted that the defendants sought
to distinguish this case from previous interstate nuisance cases because of the “scale and
complexity” of climate change. But, citing Justice Holmes’ recognition of the germ theory of
disease in Missouri v. Illinois, she observed that “public nuisance law, like common law
generally, adapts to changing scientific and factual circumstances.” 191 Justice Ginsburg
concluded that it was not necessary to address these issues because the Clean Air Act’s
authorization to EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions displaced federal common law
nuisance claims. 192
On the displacement issue the Court was unanimous in its holding. 193 “We hold that the
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Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek
abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.” 194 The test for
displacement “is simply whether the statute ‘speaks[s] directly to [the] question’ at issue,” the
Court declared, and the Clean Air “Act ‘speaks directly’ to emissions of carbon dioxide” from
power plants. 195 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that federal common law is not
displaced until EPA actually exercises its authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. 196
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court explained that the “critical point is that Congress
delegated to EPA the decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from
power plants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law.” 197 Justice Ginsburg stated
that “were EPA to decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions altogether at the conclusion of
its ongoing § 7411 rulemaking, the federal courts would have no warrant to employ the federal
common law of nuisance to upset the agency's expert determination.” 198 But she emphasized
that a decision not to regulate “would not escape judicial review” and that “EPA may not
decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants if refusal to act would be
‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’.” 199
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes that EPA, as the expert administrative agency entrusted by
Congress with the task of controlling air pollution, “is surely better equipped to do the job than
individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.” 200 EPA can utilize
scientific, economic and technological expertise and resources that judges lack. 201 The order of
decisionmaking prescribed by Congress – “the first decided under the Act is the expert
administrative agency, the second federal judges” – is fitting because the “appropriate amount
of regulation in any particular greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot be prescribed in a
vacuum.” 202 Competing interests including the nation’s energy needs and the effects of
regulation on the economy must be weighed. 203
Justice Ginsburg reserved judgment on the question whether state common law
nuisance actions are preempted by the Clean Air Act, noting that it was a question that had not
been briefed or argued. 204 But she cited Ouellette’s holding that the Clean Water Act did not
preempt such suits when the law of the source state was applied. Justice Alito, joined by
Justice Thomas, filed a one-sentence concurrence stating that they agreed with the Court’s
displacement analysis on the assumption, which had not been challenged in the case, that
Massachusetts v. EPA had correctly interpreted the Clean Air Act to cover emissions of
greenhouse gases. 205 The two were among the four dissenters to this holding in Massachusetts.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric Power confirms that the Clean Air
Act broadly preempts the federal common law of nuisance for interstate air pollution, while
leaving open the use of state common law actions to redress such problems. The Court
properly rejects efforts to erect constitutional obstacles to climate litigation even as it blocks the
use of federal common law in such actions. Because the Court founds displacement of federal
common law on the Clean Air Act’s delegation of authority to EPA, were a future Congress to
strip EPA of such authority, federal common law actions could come back into play.
C. Carp: Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Even though the federal common law of nuisance has been displaced for interstate
disputes over air and water pollutants by the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, respectively,
it still can be used to address transboundary environmental problems. Most recently states have
invoked it in an effort to stop the spread of two invasive species of Asian carp (bighead carp
and silver carp) into the Great Lakes. The route of the carp’s invasion is the very canal – the
Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal – that gave rise to the first major interstate pollution dispute
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court – Missouri v. Illinois.
Initially imported into the U.S. by fish farms in Arkansas, 206 the carp escaped to the
Mississippi River and are working their way upstream to the canal from which it is feared they
will enter Lake Michigan and spread throughout the Great Lakes. The carp, which can grow to
60 pounds or more, “ are voracious eaters that consume small organisms on which the entire
food chain relies; they crowd out native species as they enter new environments; they
reproduce at a high rate; they travel quickly and adapt readily; and they have a dangerous habit
of jumping out of the water and harming people and property.” 207
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers initially employed an “electric fence” in the water to
deter the invasive carp from moving further upstream. But on November 20, 2009 Asian carp
DNA was found in a water sample upstream of the fence. In December 2009 the Chicago
Sanitary and Ship Canal was closed temporarily while a poison was employed to try to kill the
Asian carp. A massive fish kill ensued, but only a single dead carp was found.
On December 21, 2009, the state of Michigan asked the U.S. Supreme Court to reopen
previous litigation over the canal and to issue a preliminary injunction requiring the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and Chicago’s Municipal Water Reclamation District to close the locks on
the Chicago Area Waterway System (CAWS) to block the carp from reaching Lake
Michigan. 208 Joined as plaintiffs by the states of Wisconsin, Minnesota, New York, Ohio and
Pennsylvania, Michigan also sought a permanent injunction requiring eradication of the Asian
carp from the CAWS. These states argue that the potential economic damage to commercial
206
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and recreational fishing and tourism from an Asian carp invasion of the Great Lakes would be
far greater than the losses to Illinois caused by halting shipping on the canal. 209 The U.S.
Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court not to hear the case as an original action, but rather
to allow the states to file suit in the federal district court. 210 In January 2010 and again in
March 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to exercise its original jurisdiction to hear the
case. 211
After failing to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to act, five states (all of the previous
plaintiffs except for the state of New York) on July 19, 2010 filed a federal public nuisance
action in federal district court in Illinois. 212 The suit alleged that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers had created a public nuisance by managing the CAWS in a manner that would allow
the Asian carp to reach the Great Lakes. 213 The states asked the court to issue an injunction
requiring the closing of the CAWS locks and requiring the Corps to develop a plan to
permanently separate the carp-infested Chicago River from Lake Michigan. 214 The Corps
opposed the lawsuit by arguing that it did not have the legal authority to separate physically the
Mississippi and Great Lakes basins and that Congress would have to amend existing law
directing that the CAWS be used for navigation. 215 The Corps noted that to date Congress had
directed the Corps only to study options for preventing the transfer of invasive aquatic species
between the two basins. 216
On December 2, 2010, federal district Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. denied the states their
request for a preliminary injunction. 217 Judge Dow upheld the right of the states to bring a
federal common law nuisance action after concluding that Congress had not displaced it with
legislation addressing the invasive species problem. 218
Judge Dow first addressed the proper legal standard for finding displacement of federal
common law. “Apparent comprehensiveness of Congressional legislation is only one
indication of displacement. While there appeared to be comprehensive legislation on the
subject of water pollution in Milwaukee I, for there to be displacement, the comprehensive
legislation also must address the problem at issue and do so specifically to displace the
common law.” 219 He then rejected the defendants’ argument that such displacement had
occurred. “The federal statutes cited by Defendants and the City as having purportedly
displaced federal common law do not comprehensively and specifically address the threat of an
Asian carp invasion of Lake Michigan through the CAWS to the degree found in Milwaukee II,
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nor do they provide a specific mandate or methods for adequately addressing the threat.” 220 He
noted that “the only specific statutory provision relating to aquatic nuisance species in the
CAWS” was a 1996 authorization in 16 U.S.C. § 4722(i)(3) for a “dispersal barrier
demonstration” project to stop invasive species such as zebra mussels and round goby from
reaching the Mississippi River basin from the Great Lakes through the CAWS. 221 While noting
that bills had been introduced in Congress specifically to address the Asian carp problem,
Judge Dow concluded that existing federal statutes “do not approach the level of
comprehensiveness, specificity, and all-inclusiveness found by the Supreme Court to have
displaced the common law nuisance action, as in Milwaukee II.” 222
Despite upholding the right of the Great Lakes states to bring a federal nuisance action,
Judge Dow denied their request for a preliminary injunction. 223 He concluded that while the
potential damage to the Great Lakes was high, the level of certainty that any damage will occur
is low. 224 He also noted that judicial restraint was in order because “multiple federal and state
agencies are expending significant effort carrying out their statutory and regulatory duties to
maintain and operate the CAWS, study and address the threat of Asian carp, and take whatever
emergency measures they deem appropriate to prevent Asian carp ‘from dispersing into the
Great Lakes’.” 225 Balancing the potential for increased flooding and economic hardships
associated with closing the canal against “the more remote harm associated with the possibility
that Asian carp will breach the electronic barriers in significant numbers, swim through the
sluice gates and locks, and establish a sustainable population in Lake Michigan,” he determined
that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. 226
The plaintiff States appealed Judge Dow’s ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. In July 2011, while the appeal was pending, the Corps of Engineers released a
list of 40 aquatic invasive species that it believes pose the greatest risk of migrating through the
CAWS. On this list were thirty species, including zebra mussels, that pose a significant risk to
the Mississippi River Basin and ten, including the Asian carp, that threaten the Great Lakes.
This study helped mobilize a bipartisan coalition of state attorneys general to lobby Congress to
require permanent ecological separation between the Great Lakes and Mississippi River
basins. 227
In August 2011 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers indicated that it would consider a
proposal to re-reverse the flow of the Chicago River as a means for dealing with the invasive
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species problem. 228 The Asian carp are now believed to be within 25 miles of Lake Michigan
and Asian carp DNA has been found within six miles of the lake.
On August 24, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the
district court decision refusing to require the Corps to take additional action to control Asian
carp. 229 Although it denied the states the relief they requested, the court affirmed their right to
use the federal common law of nuisance to address the threat posed by the Asian carp, while
reserving the question whether a state can bring a public nuisance claim against a federal
agency. 230 The court became the first U.S. Court of Appeals to assess the impact of the
Supreme Court’s American Electric Power decision on the federal common law of nuisance.
The Seventh Circuit panel, in an opinion by Judge Diane Wood, rejected the
defendants’ arguments that nuisance actions must be confined to traditional pollutants. 231
“While it may be true that the introduction of an invasive species of fish into a new ecosystem
does not fit the concept of nuisance as neatly as a spill of toxic chemicals into a stream, we do
not think the Supreme Court has limited the concept of public nuisance as much as the
defendants suggest.” 232 The court declared that “[I]t would be arbitrary to conclude that this
type of action extends to the harm caused by industrial pollution but not to the environmental
and economic destruction caused by the introduction of an invasive, non-native organism into a
new ecosystem.” 233
Relying on the statement in American Electric Power that “the delegation is what
displaces,” the Corps of Engineers and the City of Chicago argued that the Supreme Court had
created a new and more expansive test for displacement: federal common law is displaced once
Congress indicates its intention to delegate a particular problem to an executive agency. 234 The
Seventh Circuit panel rejected this argument. 235 It concluded that “the Court did not establish a
new test based solely on Congress’s delegation of regulatory power; it simply pointed out that
delegation is one type of congressional action that is evidence of displacement.” 236 The court
noted that numerous laws had been enacted that governed interstate waters at the time of the
Milwaukee I case, but it was not until the Clean Water Act’s comprehensive permit scheme was
adopted that federal common law was held to be displaced in Milwaukee II. 237 It stressed that
in American Electric Power the Supreme Court had emphasized the comprehensive nature of
the Clean Air Act even with respect to regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and the multiple
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avenues for public and private enforcement as well as the right of the public to seek judicial
review of denials of petitions for rulemakings. 238
In contrast to the Clean Air Act’s provisions, “congressional efforts to curb the
migration of invasive species, and of invasive carp in particular, have yet to reach the level of
detail one sees in the air or water pollution schemes.” 239 The court surveyed existing federal
legislation on invasive species. 240 The Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act was
enacted by Congress in 1990 to stop the spread of zebra mussels and other nuisance species. 241
This legislation establishes an Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force to study and to implement
measures “to prevent introduction and dispersal of aquatic nuisance species.” 242 This legislation
was amended in 1996 by the National Invasive Species Act that inspired the Corps to employ
an electronic barrier in the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal. In 2007 Congress enacted the
Water Resources Development Act that authorized the Corps to build a second barrier 243 and
the Corps was given money in the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 to
complete a third barrier.
The Seventh Circuit panel concluded that “[a]lthough this legislation demonstrates that
Congress is aware of the problem of invasive species generally, and carp in particular, it falls
far short” of the provisions of the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act that were found to displace
federal common law. 244 The court noted that “neither the Corps nor any other agency has been
empowered actively to regulate the problem of invasive carp, and Congress has not required
any agency to establish a single standard to deal with the problem or to take any other
action.” 245 It also emphasized that no enforcement mechanism has been created by Congress
that would give parties adversely affected by the carp recourse to the courts. 246 Thus, the court
concluded that federal common law had not been displaced.
Nevertheless, the court upheld the district court’s decision not to issue a preliminary
injunction. 247 While finding that it was not an abuse of discretion, the court took issue with
Judge Dow’s assessment of the risks posed by the carp. 248 The court believed that plaintiffs
demonstrated “a good or perhaps even a substantial likelihood of harm – that is a non-trivial
chance that the carp will invade Lake Michigan in numbers great enough to constitute a public
nuisance.” 249 But the court was persuaded that the defendants already “have mounted a fullscale effort to stop the carp from reaching the Great Lakes,” and “has promised that additional
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steps will be taken in the near future.” 250 Thus, it concluded that in light of the Corps ongoing
active efforts a preliminary injunction “would only get in the way.” The panel emphasized,
however, “that if the agencies slip into somnolence or if the record reveals new information at
the permanent injunction stage, this conclusion can be revisited.” 251
The Seventh Circuit’s decision indicates that, even after the Supreme Court’s American
Electric Power decision, the federal common law of nuisance retains some relevance for
addressing a very narrow class of transboundary environmental problems. Yet the court’s
denial of relief also reflects the reality that agencies are far better equipped than the judiciary to
formulate solutions to these problems. This reality should help shape a reconsideration of the
role of interstate nuisance law.

III. RECONSIDERING THE COMMON LAW OF INTERSTATE NUISANCE
After the Supreme Court’s recent American Electric Power decision, common law of
interstate nuisance risks being dismissed as but a historic curiosity. After all, comprehensive
federal regulatory programs have now displaced the federal common law of interstate nuisance
for air and water pollution, though state common law actions may be used to address such
problems if the law of the source state is applied. Federal common law may continue to be
used to address other transboundary environmental problems, such as the spread of invasive
species, but these are likely to remain fairly rare.
This section of the paper considers how to reconceptualize the role of the common law
of interstate nuisance in light of these developments. First it considers the circumstances that
now govern the displacement of federal common law and why they could provide a useful
backstop against current efforts in Congress to roll back federal regulatory programs. It then
explores the continued viability of interstate nuisance actions under state common law in light
of North Carolina’s state nuisance action against coal-fired power plants operated by the
Tennessee Valley Authority in other states. The paper then reviews the effects of interstate
nuisance litigation in historical context and concludes that despite the inherent limitations of
judicially-fashioned relief, the common law has been a catalyst for change, initially spurring
the development and implementation of new pollution control technology, and now
encouraging executive and legislative action to address emerging or long-neglected
environmental problems. Direct judicial intervention to stop interstate pollution remains rare,
but the common law of interstate nuisance still retains vitality as a backstop that could return to
prominence if regulatory authorities are barred from acting in the future.
A. Displacement of Federal Common Law
Although the Supreme Court unanimously decided in American Electric Power v.
Connecticut that the federal common law of interest nuisance for climate change was displaced
by the Clean Air Act, 252 the Justices (by a 4-4 vote) rejected pleas that they permanently bury
250

Id.
Id.
252
131 S.Ct. 2527 (2009)
251

29

such litigation on constitutional (political question or standing) grounds. 253 Despite finding
displacement, all of the other seven Justices participating in the decision agreed, somewhat
surprisingly, with Justice Ginsburg’s ringing endorsement of the concept of “the new federal
common law” to protect the environment. 254 Relying on the late Judge Henry Friendly’s 1964
Benjamin Cardozo Lecture on “In Praise of Erie – and of the New Federal Common Law,” 255
Justice Ginsburg boldly declares that environmental protection is “an area ‘within national
legislative power,’ one in which federal courts may fill in ‘statutory interstices,’ and, if
necessary, even ‘fashion federal law.’” 256
Citing many of the cases discussed in Part I of this paper (Missouri v. Illinois, New
Jersey v. City of New York, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, and Milwaukee I) Justice Ginsburg
notes that the Court often has entertained “federal common law suits brought by one State to
abate pollution emanating from another State.” 257 She appropriately describes these cases as
instances in which “States were permitted to sue to challenge activity harmful to their citizens’
health and welfare.” 258 Thus, the American Electric Power Court actually endorses the notion
that protection against interstate air and water pollution is an area where “specialized federal
common law” makes sense.
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion then sheds some light on the criteria the Court will use in
determining whether regulatory legislation has displaced the federal common law of interstate
nuisance. Prior to the Court’s decision there had been considerable debate over the appropriate
standard for finding displacement. Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Milwaukee II had
emphasized the comprehensive nature of the Clean Water Act’s prohibition of unpermitted
discharges of water pollution. 259 In American Electric Power Justice Ginsburg frames the test
as involving whether the regulatory statute “speaks directly” to the emissions the plaintiffs seek
to control. 260 In light of the Court ‘s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA that greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions could be regulated under the Clean Air Act, EPA’s subsequent
“endangerment finding,” and regulatory initiatives to control GHG emissions, the American
Electric Power Court has no trouble finding displacement of the federal common law. 261
The Court does not specify precisely how courts are to determine whether a statute
“speaks directly” to the transboundary emissions targeted by the interstate nuisance action.
Arguable coverage is probably not enough, but a Supreme Court decision like Massachusetts v.
EPA that expressly confirms such regulatory authority and requires EPA to determine whether
or not to exercise it, clearly seems to qualify. But what is particularly interesting about Justice
Ginsburg’s decision is her emphasis on the importance of courts exercising judicial review over
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whether and how the EPA exercises this authority. 262 She notes that “[i]f EPA does not set
emissions limits for a particular pollutant or source of pollution, States and private parties may
petition for a rulemaking on the matter, and EPA’s response will be reviewable in federal
court.” 263 Justice Ginsburg also notes the availability of citizen suits to enforce emissions limits
against regulated sources. 264 This suggests that the judiciary should continue to play an
important oversight role. If federal common law is to be displaced, then the judiciary should at
least be able to police subsequent decisions by regulatory authorities to eschew regulation.
Moreover, if efforts by Republicans in Congress to amend the Clean Air Act to deprive EPA of
authority to regulate GHG emissions ever are successful, the rationale for displacement of
federal common law will disappear
Consistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in the case, the plaintiffs had argued that
federal common law was not displaced until EPA actually exercises the regulatory authority
over GHG emissions that had been confirmed in Massachusetts v. EPA. But the American
Electric Power Court unanimously rejected this view. Citing Milwaukee II, Justice Ginsburg
concludes that “the relevant question for purposes of displacement is ‘whether the field has
been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner’.” 265 Because major
regulations often take agencies years to promulgate, it makes some sense for courts to defer to
agencies who commit to regulate pollutants that otherwise would be the subject of interstate
nuisance actions, particularly when the agencies work for an administration that supports such
regulations. But the American Electric Power decision indicates that such a commitment is not
necessary for displacement to be found, so long as it is clear that the statute gives the agency
regulatory authority and that a decision not to exercise it can be subjected to judicial review.
The Administrative Procedure Act grants the public the right to petition agencies for the
issuance of rules. 266 While agencies have an obligation to respond to these petitions, in practice
they often are ignored for many years and it is extremely difficult to establish that a failure to
respond is agency action “unreasonably delayed” that can be redressed by judicial review. 267
Indeed, the Massachusetts v. EPA litigation never would have made it through the courthouse
doors except for the fact that the Bush administration wanted to trumpet its new policy decision
that EPA did not have the authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. It
thus seized upon a petition from an obscure NGO asking EPA to conduct a rulemaking on
GHG emissions from mobile sources and denied it to emphasize the new policy. Had that not
happened, the petition probably could still be sitting at EPA unanswered and Massachusetts v.
EPA never would have made it to court. Thus, Justice Ginsburg may be overly optimistic about
the availability of judicial review to address inaction by an administrative agency. But the fact
that she emphasizes this and the Clean Air Act’s judicial review provisions suggests that her
rationale for displacement of federal common law actions is founded in part on the notion that
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the judiciary will be available to police irrational inaction by the expert executive agency
charged by law with protecting the public against interstate air pollution.
The purpose of the federal common law of interstate nuisance was ably articulated by
Justice Harlan in his opinion for the Court in a case it declined to hear – Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp. 268 Justice Harlan argued that prior decisions by U.S. Supreme Court to
exercise its original jurisdiction to hear such cases were founded on “the belief that no State
should be compelled to resort to the tribunals of other States for redress, since parochial factors
might often lead to the appearance, if not the reality, of partially to one’s own.” 269 Yet in
Milwaukee II the Court’s decision that federal common law had been displaced left the state of
Illinois in the unenviable position of trying to convince a Wisconsin state agency that it should
not permit the sewage discharges it challenged in its nuisance action. Though Illinois could ask
EPA to veto permits issued by Wisconsin, this is an authority that EPA exercises only rarely.
Professor Thomas Merrill accurately predicted that the Supreme Court in American
Electric Power would opt for “field displacement” rather than “conflict displacement” as the
test for displacement of federal common law. 270 Merrill notes that Milwaukee II was ambiguous
on the test that should be used to find displacement of federal common law and has language
that could support either standard. 271 Ultimately the issue is a question of congressional intent
and most federal environmental laws have savings clauses that disavow any intent to displace
common law remedies. Yet Merrill argues that the greater competency of the executive branch
to resolve complex environmental disputes should support a “special presumption” by
Congress against “judicial lawmaking.” 272
American Electric Power did not entirely displace the use of federal common law to
address transboundary environmental problems. As noted in Part II, two months after
American Electric Power (AEP) was decided, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
rejected claims that AEP had created a new test for displacement of federal common law. The
court upheld use of the federal common law of interstate nuisance to address the threat to the
Great Lakes posed by invasive species of Asian carp. After holding that the concept of
interstate nuisance was sufficiently broad to embrace the spread of invasive species, the court
rejected claims that AEP had relaxed the test for finding displacement. It is not enough that
Congress indicates its intention to delegate a particular problem to an executive agency, the
Seventh Circuit panel stated. 273 Rather delegation is only “one type of congressional action that
is evidence of displacement.” 274 Even though Congress had mentioned the invasive carp and
directed that the problem be studied, the court concluded that congressional awareness of a
problem “falls far short” of the kind of displacement for interstate nuisances previously found
in the Clean Water and Clean Air Act. 275
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision suggests that displacement of federal common law may
require a directive from Congress to regulate as well as provisions giving parties adversely
affected by the transboundary problem recourse to judicial remedies. 276 This represents a fair
reading of the AEP decision, particularly in the context of an emerging environmental
controversy not directly addressed by existing legislation.
B. Federalism, Preemption and the State Common Law of Interstate Nuisance
One of the great ironies of federal environmental law is that transboundary pollution
problems, which served as a principal justification for federalizing U.S. environmental
protection law, have until recently been so poorly addressed by federal regulatory programs. 277
Despite agencies’ greater expertise in determining appropriate levels of pollution control,
political forces often have stymied agency action. The Clean Air Act long has had provisions
authorizing EPA to regulate transboundary air pollution, 278 but the agency refused to use these
authorities until the waning days of the Clinton administration. This history convinces
Professor Merrill that, “insofar as multi-jurisdictional air pollution problems are concerned,
some type of decisive congressional intervention is required before effective regulatory action
will be taken against the problem.” 279
During the long legislative gridlock over problems of acid rain and interstate ozone
transport, environmental groups tried mightily to convince the federal judiciary to require EPA
to exercise its Clean Air Act authority to regulate transboundary pollution. Plaintiffs repeatedly
were rebuffed. Courts cited the difficulty of proving interstate interference with attainment and
maintenance of national air quality standards given the difficulty of tracing the transport of
pollutants over long distances. At times they candidly admitted their preference for greater
direction from Congress concerning how to resolve what were perceived as fierce regional
conflicts. 280 Yet the very political factors that made agency officials reluctant to act, including
276
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differential impacts on source and victim states also made it difficult for Congress to legislate
to resolve transboundary pollution problems. 281
In American Electric Power the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on the
question whether the Clean Air Act preempts the application of state common law in lawsuits
involving interstate nuisance claims. Citing Ouellette, Justice Ginsburg noted that “the
availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal
Act.” 282 Because the issue had not been briefed or argued in the AEP litigation, the court
deferred judgment on this issue. 283 Yet Ouellette made it clear that the Clean Water Act’s
displacement of the federal common law of interstate nuisance did not displace state common
law so long as the law of the source state, rather than the law of the downwind state, was
used. 284
Mindful of the teachings of Milwaukee II and Ouellette, the attorney general of North
Carolina did not invoke federal common law when he brought a public nuisance suit against the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The suit alleged that transboundary air pollution from the
59 electrical generating units (EGUs) at TVA’s eleven coal-fired power plants in Tennessee,
Alabama and Kentucky were causing significant harm to residents of North Carolina in
violation of state common law. 285 But in light of Ouellette’s rule that the law of the source
state must be applied, North Carolina argued that the emissions were public nuisances under
the common law of Tennessee, Alabama and Kentucky, where the plants were located, rather
than under North Carolina common law.
As described in Part II, the district judge hearing North Carolina’s lawsuit determined
that only emissions from the four power plants located within 100 miles of North Carolina’s
western border (three in Tennessee and one in Alabama) had been shown to be interfering
unreasonably with the health and safety of residents of North Carolina. 286 The judge found that
the other 37 EGUs at seven other TVA power plants were “too remote to significantly impact
air quality in North Carolina to the extent necessary to prove public nuisance.” 287 While finding
that “TVA’s generation of power at low cost to the consuming public has a high social utility,”
Judge Thornburg concluded that “the vast extent of the harms caused in North Carolina by the
secondary pollutants emitted by these plants outweighs any utility that may exist from leaving
capable of instructing the EPA to address particular matters promptly. . . Congress did not
supply such direction in this instance; instead, it allowed and has left unchecked the EPA’s
current approach to interstate air pollution. The judiciary, therefore, is not the proper place in
which to urge alteration of the Agency’s course.” New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 581 (1988)
(R. Ginsburg, concurring).
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their pollution untreated.” 288 He also concluded that “TVA’s failure to speedily install readily
available pollution control technology is not, and has not been, reasonable conduct under the
circumstances.” 289 Thus, Judge Thornburg ruled that emissions from these TVA plants would
constitute public nuisances under the common law of Tennessee and Alabama. 290
Expressing fear that Judge Thornburg’s ruling and the relief he ordered “would
encourage courts to use vague public nuisance standards to scuttle the nation’s carefully created
system for accommodating the need for energy production and the need for clean air,” the
Fourth Circuit reversed on appeal. 291 Although it purported to be applying Ouellette, the
Fourth Circuit’s decision strongly implies that the Clean Air Act preempts state nuisance law.
It does so by emphasizing that the plants subject to Judge Thornburg’s order already are
regulated extensively by federal and state law and are in compliance with these regulations.
After accusing Judge Thornburg of applying North Carolina common law, the Fourth Circuit
concludes that even if it could be said that the district court had applied source state law as
opposed to North Carolina law, TVA’s operations would not have constituted a nuisance
because its plants were in compliance with state issued permits. 292 Writing for the Fourth
Circuit panel, Judge Wilkinson is in effect saying that compliance with existing regulations is a
complete defense to a common law nuisance action, even though the trial judge found that this
is not the case under Tennessee and Alabama nuisance law. 293 This would remove the ability of
state common law to serve its traditional role as a backstop to redress harm that is not
adequately prevented by regulation.
In Ouellette the Supreme Court explained that the application of the common law of the
source state would alleviate concerns that state common law actions would interfere with the
federal regulatory infrastructure. Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s distrust of any state tort action that
seeks to impose “different” standards than the regulatory scheme is misplaced. 294 In Ouellette
the Supreme Court explained that only affected states have the “potential to undermine [the]
regulatory structure” of federal law by ascribing to them a greater role than Congress
envisioned. 295 The Court noted that if any affected state could apply its own common law to
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emissions from a source state a single point source could be subjected to multiple standards. 296
It was within this context that the Court stated, “it is unlikely… that Congress intended to
establish such a chaotic structure.” 297
Application of source state law common law, on the other hand, was endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Ouellette precisely because these concerns did not apply when source state
law was used. 298 The Court recognized a “regulatory partnership” between the federal
government and the source state due to the role envisioned for the source state within the Clean
Water Act. 299 Like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act establishes source state permitting
systems and allows states to impose stricter standards than those required by federal law
without undermining the federal-state regulatory partnership. 300 Thus, the Court held an action
brought under source state law “would not frustrate the goals of the CWA” because it did not
upset the balance among the interests of the federal government, the source state, and the
affected state, and because it restricted the number of “indeterminate… potential regulations”
to only a single additional authority. 301 The Fourth Circuit correctly noted that Ouellette did
not foreclose all state tort actions, 302 yet it failed to recognize the Court’s nuanced distinction
between affected and source state actions when it concluded that Ouellette supported its
contention that due to their “considerable potential mischief… the strongest cautionary
presumption” should apply against state nuisance actions. 303
296
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When it declared that any state tort action seeking to establish standards “different”
from the state or federal scheme deserves the “strongest cautionary presumption” against it, 304
the Fourth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court’s directive in Ouellette not to lightly infer
preemption. 305 Although the Fourth Circuit was careful not to “state categorically” a flat-out
preemption rule, its “strongest cautionary presumption” language encourages trial courts to
characterize all state tort actions involving air pollution, regardless of whether applying the
common law of an affected or source state, as inherently suspect. This imposes a much higher
burden on plaintiffs than the Supreme Court ever intended.
In Milwaukee II the Court explained that the standard for inferring displacement of
“federal common law is not the same as that employed in deciding if federal law preempts state
law.” 306 The latter, because it involves superseding the “historic police powers of the States”
should not be inferred without a determination that it “was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress” to do so. 307 Federalism concerns are not implicated in assessing displacement of
federal common law, the Court explained, because in such cases “we start with the assumption
that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as
a matter of federal law.” 308 Thus, despite the concerns, expressed in American Electric Power,
about judicial competence to decide complex transboundary nuisance cases, it should be
difficult to find preemption of source state common law, particularly in light of the savings
clauses contained in the federal environmental statutes. 309
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C. The Common Law as a Catalyst for Change
The historical record demonstrates that states invoking the common law of interstate
nuisance have rarely succeeding in getting the judiciary to solve transboundary pollution
problems. As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court did stop New York City, at least for
awhile, from dumping its garbage at sea, which required the city to build more garbage
incinerators. And the Court eventually forced Chicago to build its first sewage treatment plant
in order to curb its excessive water diversions that were lowering the level of the Great Lakes.
Even the air pollution injunction issued by the Supreme Court to protect Georgia from further
damage from polluting copper smelters in Tennessee only required intermittent controls –
production cutbacks during the growing season – that later were abandoned. 310
But the historical record also suggests that interstate nuisance actions have been a
significant catalyst for change quite beyond the immediate impact of any judicially awarded
relief. Fear that the Court might eventually order the smelters in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
to shut down helped spur the development of new technology – the lead-acid chamber method
– to control pollution from copper smelters. Although the Fourth Circuit reversed the order
North Carolina had obtained to require TVA’s power plants to install new pollution control
equipment, the litigation ultimately culminated in a settlement that achieved the kind of relief
the state initially sought. Despite being dismissed in the U.S. Supreme Court, the American
Electric Power litigation for seven years placed the contribution of coal-fired power plants to
climate change in the national spotlight. The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision refusing for
now to order the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to close the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal
to block the spread of invasive species of carp was coupled with the admonition that the court
could intervene in the future if the threat continues to grow.
But the common law of interstate nuisance has other virtues even apart from the well
known deterrent impact of tort law. Benjamin Ewing and Douglas Kysar describe the role of
the modern common law of nuisance as part of a complex mosaic of “overlapping governance
mechanisms” that “help to span jurisdictions and to marshal different fact-finding
competencies, remedial powers, and value orientations.” 311 Such mechanisms help to “ensure a
fuller and more inclusive characterization of emerging threats to social and environmental wellbeing.” 312 They are part of what Ewing and Kysar describe as “prods and pleas,” a kind of
check against institutions who fail to perform their assigned roles to meet societal needs. 313
Few people expected that an interstate nuisance action to address climate change
ultimately would be successful, 314 but the litigation was deemed useful by many as a means for
310
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putting greater pressure on companies and Congress to support comprehensive legislation
regulating emissions of greenhouse gases. 315 For now it seems certain that Congress will not
adopt such legislation in the wake of the 2010 mid-term elections that gave the Republican
party control of the U.S. House of Representatives, but escalating evidence of harm caused by
climate change eventually may alter this political dynamic.
A century ago the Supreme Court used its original jurisdiction to hear interstate
nuisance actions to redress transboundary air and water pollution. Even in the absence of
comprehensive federal regulatory programs to protect the environment, the Court recognized
the importance of leveraging the impact of its equitable powers on other institutional actors. In
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper the Court deliberately withheld for several years the issuance of
an injunction limiting smelter emissions in order to give the state of Georgia and the smelter
companies time to negotiate a settlement that balanced environmental and economic concerns.
Faced with the threat of an injunction, the Tennessee Copper Company eventually settled with
the state of Georgia by establishing an administrative compensation fund while agreeing to
restrict its operations during the growing season. The Court then issued an injunction against
the non-settling Ducktown Copper, Sulphur and Iron Company, 316 which was modified a year
later to permit a 25 percent increase in smelter emissions. 317 The Ducktown Company
eventually agreed to a settlement with terms similar to that previously agreed to by Tennessee
Copper with both companies participating in the administrative compensation scheme. 318
When the Supreme Court denied relief to New York City in its lawsuit to block New
Jersey’s construction of a sewage tunnel to New York Bay, the Court cited a settlement that
New Jersey had reached with the federal government. This settlement helped ensure that the
environmental consequences of the additional sewage discharge into New York Bay would be
policed by another branch of government. 319
The states that today are trying to use the common law of interstate nuisance to prevent
invasive carp from reaching the Great Lakes view such litigation as only one part of a much
larger strategy for persuading government actors to intervene. 320 They realize that preliminary
315
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defeats in litigation can lay the groundwork for future success in court. 321 The converse also
can be true, as North Carolina’s litigation against the TVA demonstrates, but such common law
actions now engage the federal courts and Congress “as partners in an ongoing colloquy over
the interpretation and lawfulness of statutes” with common law judgments functioning as “an
integral part of this colloquy.” 322
When the regulatory and political processes fail to prevent significant harm from
transboundary pollution, the threat of litigation under the common law of interstate nuisance
remains a useful prod to action by other branches of government. This action can include not
only new laws or regulatory action to address emerging or neglected problems, but also laws to
restrict the scope of state common law. In 2011 both the Texas and Utah state legislatures
passed laws insulating permitted discharges from nuisance liability premised on climate
change. 323
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress first enacted comprehensive federal regulatory programs to protect the
environment in the early 1970s. Prior to the enactment of such programs, a primary legal
vehicle for redressing pollution problems was the common law of nuisance. Early in the
twentieth century, states invoked the federal common law of nuisance to seek intervention by
the U.S. Supreme Court in disputes over transboundary air and water pollution. The Court,
exercising its original jurisdiction over disputes between states, heard several interstate
nuisance cases and used its equitable powers to stop environmentally destructive actions.
After more than a century of evolution, the federal common law of interstate nuisance
has been largely eclipsed by the rise of the regulatory state. Yet reports concerning its demise
hydrological separation study (which is the real solution to Asian carp and the next invasive species,
whatever it may be) this case continues to have importance. For the rest of us who care about the Great
Lakes, we must continue to press for action from the White House and Congress. As the legal battle
over injunctions and common law public nuisance demonstrates, the current law is, at best, inadequate
and we need comprehensive federal legislation attacking aquatic invasive species from all vectors.”
Noah Hall, Another Setback in the Legal Fight to Keep Asian Carp Out of the Great Lakes, Great Lakes
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appear to be premature. The long-time failure of regulatory authorities to deal effectively with
transboundary pollution from aging coal-fired power plants and emerging problems of climate
change and invasive species have inspired new 21st century lawsuits by states invoking the
common law of interstate nuisance. Trial and appellate courts hearing such lawsuits have been
badly split.
After a lengthy trial a North Carolina federal district court ordered coal-fired power
plants in Tennessee and Alabama to control their emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxide, only to be reversed on appeal. A New York district court dismissed a lawsuit seeking
controls on emissions of greenhouse gases by Midwestern coal-fired power plants on the
ground that it was a political question, only to be reversed on appeal to the Second Circuit.
When the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the latter decision, industry groups relished an
opportunity to kill all climate litigation on standing or political question grounds. But they
ultimately were disappointed in June 2011 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided American
Electric Power v. Connecticut.
Although the Court in American Electric Power held that federal common law nuisance
actions to redress climate change had been displaced by the Clean Air Act and EPA’s efforts to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions, it affirmed the standing of states to sue, rejected the notion
such lawsuits raise nonjusticiable political questions, and left open the door to state common
law nuisance actions to redress climate change. Principles of federalism and the extensive
savings clauses in the federal environmental laws will make it difficult to preempt the state
common law of nuisance. Thus, if a state can show that its residents are suffering significant
injury that federal regulatory authorities have failed to prevent and for which an express
decision to preempt state law has not been made, state common law actions founded on the law
of the source state will remain available.
In American Electric Power, the Court reaffirmed that environmental protection was a
proper subject for the development of federal common law. It also emphasized that expert
administrative agencies generally are more capable than the judiciary at fashioning solutions
for complex environmental problems. Yet the judiciary has played an important role as a
“prod” and catalyst for action by the other branches of government when activities causing
significant harm otherwise have escaped regulation. Direct judicial intervention to stop
interstate pollution is rare today, but when regulation fails, common law remedies remain an
important backstop whose importance may increase at a time of audacious efforts by some
members of Congress to roll back federal environmental regulations. American Electric Power
forestalls federal common law nuisance litigation over climate change, but it does so only by
insisting that the problem is being addressed by existing federal regulatory authorities.
In December 2011 the minority staff of the House Energy and Commerce Committee
reported that in 2011the U.S. House of Representatives took 191 votes to weaken federal
environmental law. 324 Displacement of federal common law in American Electric Power and
other cases has been premised on federal law “directly speaking” to problems such as climate
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change and interstate air and water pollution. If Congress succeeds in rolling back federal
environmental law addressing these problems, federal common law remedies could spring into
action once again.
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